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HOLISTIC MEDICINE AND FREEDOM
OF RELIGION
I. INTRODUCTION
Of the personal rights secured by the United States Constitution,
few have been so jealously guarded, so resolutely championed as the
right of religious freedom.' That right is assured by the emphatic lan-
guage of the first amendment providing that "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exer-
cise thereof."2 Commendable in their objective, it has only been with
difficulty that the religion clauses have been applied.' The source of
that difficulty is easily discerned. Both clauses are "cast in absolute
terms, and either. . . if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to
clash with the other."4 So far as the religion clauses are concerned,
then, the United States Supreme Court's task has been one to effect a
coalescence of antithetical constitutional imperatives, so that the
Court's efforts throughout the religion cases have been described, and
are best understood, as attempts to reconcile the two clauses.5 In Tulsa
Area Hospital Council, Inc. v. Oral Roberts University6 the Oklahoma
Supreme Court will attempt that task. The court may be called upon to
decide whether the state may consider religious beliefs in deciding
whether to allow a hospital to be built. Further, the court must decide
whether the exclusion of religious attitudes from the state's considera-
tion process violates the free exercise clause.
1. It has been observed that "[t]he place of religion in our society is an exalted one, achieved
through a long tradition of reliance on the home, the church and the inviolable citadel of the
individual heart and mind." School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 (1963). The Court also
stated: "It can be truly said, therefore, that today, as in the beginning, our national life reflects a
religious people. ... .Id at 213.
2. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
3. "The difficulty that has historically plagued courts in implementing these provisions
stems in part from the fact that their purpose 'was to state an objective, not to write a statute.'
Thus, the judiciary has necessarily been left with the task of developing rules and principles to
realize the goal of the religion clauses without freezing them into an overly rigid mold." L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-2, at 813 (1978) (footnote omitted).
4. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970).
5. See TRIBE, supra note 3, § 14-4.
6. No. 53059 (Okla., filed Sept. 10, 1979).
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II. JUDICIAL EXPLICATION OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES: THE
NEUTRALITY CLAUSES
The United States Supreme Court's efforts to reconcile the clauses
have frequently taken the form of historical excursuses by some of the
Justices,7 intended to reveal the purposes of the clauses as envisaged by
those who framed the amendment. The direct results of these historical
inquiries need not detain us,8 but it should be noted that certain of
them have been adopted by the Court "with remarkable consensus. '
Moreover, those results have moved the Court to identify certain con-
cerns of the Framers as paramount. Those concerns have profoundly
affected the interpretation of the religion clauses.
As to the establishment clause, the above-mentioned historical
scholarship has induced the Court to declare that "[i]ts (the establish-
ment clause's) first and most immediate purpose rested on the belief
that a union of government and religion tends to destroy government
and degrade religion."" ° The first and most immediate purpose of the
establishment clause was to avert an interdependence of church and
state," a purpose predicated upon the notion that the integrity of both
government and religion is best preserved where each entity remains
self-reliant and independent of the other. But what acts of state will be
7. Largely through the efforts of Justices Black and Rutledge, the Court has assumed the
role of constitutional historian in its quest after the meaning of the religion clauses. TRIBE, supra
note 2, § 14-3, at 817. Compare Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 1-18 (1974) (Black, J.) with
id at 28-74 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
This is not to say, however, that reliance upon the intent of the Framers in addressing religion
questions has been invariably applauded: "[A]n awareness of history and an appreciation of the
aims of the Founding Fathers do not always resolve concrete problems." School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 234 (1963). See, e.g., id at 237-38 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[To] rigidly
adhere to views characteristic of the Framers could gravely imperil the freedoms sought by the
two religion clauses.").
8. The histories of Black and Rutledge agree that the political-religious philosophies of Jef-
ferson and Madison are the immediate antecedents of the religion clauses. Jefferson feared that a
close association of a church and state might lead to ecclesiastical control of governmental mat-
ters. He wanted to impose a "wall of separation" between state and church, to avoid the intrusion
of religion into secular matters. M. HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS 2 (1965).
Madison also sought separatism, but his advocacy of this position stemmed from a fear of govern-
mental control of religion, an intrusion of government into matters belonging properly to ecclesi-
astics. See IX THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 487 (G. Hunt ed. 1910). See generally Hunt,
James Madison and Religious Liberty, I AM. HIsT. A. REP. 165 (1961).
9. TRIBE, supra note § 14-4, at 818. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Lib-
erty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 770 (1973); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 103-04 (1968); School Dist.
v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 214 (1963); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 430 & n.7, 437-43
(1961).
10. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,431 (1962). Thus, the historical inquiry reveals a pervading
distrust of unified government and religion to be uppermost in the minds of the Framers.
11. See note 8 supra.
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deemed to author that dependence dreaded by the Framers? Three
evils have been identified as pregnant with the threat of engendering
the forbidden dependence: sponsorship; financial support; and, active
involvement of the sovereign in religious matters.' 2 The call to avoid
these evils was translated by the Court into a mandate of neutrality.' 3
Neutrality, however, is neither an absolute nor a self-defining
term;' 4 rather, state action is adjudged to be religiously neutral or
otherwise by reference to now well-defined principles or tests devel-
oped by the Supreme Court over the course of the religion cases. Ac-
cordingly, a state is considered to have acted neutrally where it acts
pursuant to a secular purpose, 5 the activity has a primarily secular ef-
fect,16 and such action does not yield an excessive entanglement of state
with church.17
It must not be supposed that these tests are ends in themselves. 18
Instead, they are indices that reveal the presence of the primary evils
described above, which evils, in turn, portend the forbidden depen-
dence against which the establishment clause stands. 19 The tests of
neutrality, then, serve the historically identified ends of the establish-
ment clause by virtue of their special competence in bringing to bold
relief that state activity replete with the evils that lead to interdepen-
dence.
12. Eg., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
13. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 788
(1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 683 (1971); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 449
(1971); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
214 (1963).
14. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970).
15. See notes 50-54 infra and accompanying text.
16. See notes 59-64 infra and accompanying text.
17. See notes 70-76 infra and accompanying text.
18. The Court has remarked that the tests of establishment are "no more than helpful sign-
posts." Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973). The Court has likewise warned "[t]here are
always risks in treating criteria ... as 'tests' in any limiting sense of that term." Tilton v. Rich-
ardson, 403 U.S. 672, 678 (1971).
19. In dicta the Court has referred to such a relationship of the primary evils and the estab-
lishment clause tests: "In the absence of precisely stated constitutional prohibitions, we must draw
lines with reference to the three main evils against which the Establishment Clause was intended
to afford protection: 'sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in
religious activity.'" Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
The Court has also stated:
Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of the cumulative criteria
developed by the Court over many years. Three such tests may be gleaned from our
cases. First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or
primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion.
Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968). Finally, the statute must not foster "an exces-
sive government entanglement with religion." 397 U.S. at 674.
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The purpose ordinarily identified with the free exercise clause has
a rather more metaphysical underpinning than that attributed to the
establishment clause. Historical evidence indicates the purpose of the
former to be one of placing religious beliefs entirely outside the con-
cern of the state.2' This purpose rests squarely upon the determination
that such beliefs are so deeply personal in nature as to require their
being reserved to the exclusive concern of the individual. Religious
beliefs as such, therefore, are given absolute protection in having been
withdrawn altogether from matters within the legitimate scope of gov-
ernmental concern.
While religious beliefs are absolutely protected from regulation,
conduct motivated by religious belief cannot be placed beyond the
power of the state to regulate. 21 Thus, a distinction has been drawn
between beliefs and actions in cases where the Court has been called
upon to explicate the language of the free exercise clause. 2 This is not
to say, however, that the state may regulate with impunity conduct
born of religious belief.23 Rather, where regulation burdens religiously
engendered conduct, the onus falls upon the state to show that its regu-
lation is the least burdensome means available by which to effect a
compelling state end.24
The free exercise clause, then, imposes certain restrictions upon a
20. See School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222-23 (1963); United States v. Ballard, 322
U.S. 78, 86 (1944); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162-65 (1879).
21. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-06 (1940). The Court has repeatedly referred
to this belief-action distinction. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972); Braunfeld
v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 604 (1961); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944). The distinc-
tion was originally articulated in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), wherein the Court
observed: "Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion, but was left free to
reach actions which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good order." Id at 164.
22. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), where the Court recalls from its earlier
decisions that "[t]he door of the Free Exercise Clause stands tightly closed against any govern-
mental regulation of religious beliefs as such." Id at 402.
23. So stated the Supreme Court in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972):
Wisconsin concedes that under the Religion Clauses religious beliefs are absolutely free
from the State's control, but it argues that "actions," even though religiously grounded,
are outside the protection of the First Amendment. But our decisions have rejected the
idea that religiously grounded conduct is always outside the protection of the Free Exer-
cise Clause. It is true that activities of individuals, even when religiously based, are often
subject to regulation by the States in the exercise of their undoubted power to promote
the health, safety, and general welfare, or the Federal Government in the exercise of its
delegated powers. But to agree that religiously grounded conduct must often be subject
to the broad police power of the State is not to deny that there are areas of conduct
protected by the Free Exercise Clause. . . and thus beyond the power of the State to
control, even under regulations of general applicability.
Id at 220 (citations omitted).
24. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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state's capacity to act to affect even conduct where that conduct is relig-
iously engendered. It must not be supposed, however, that by "burden-
some state activity" is meant only the imposition of penalties upon
religious practices. A state burdens religion anytime it acts in a manner
which has a coercive effect upon religious beliefs. This may be the case
where a state witholds its benefits as well. 5 The free exercise clause
insists upon a demonstration of least restrictive means to compelling
end in this context as well.
It should be apparent that rarely, if ever, are there establishment
clause cases or free exercise cases.26 There are, rather, religion cases
sharing each clause. In every case in which a state seeks to include
religious institutions among the objects of benign legislation, an estab-
lishment clause question is raised; yet, should that same state deliber-
ately exclude religious institutions from among the beneficiaries of
state legislation, a free exercise claim is raised. Thus, enlightened reso-
lution of religion clause cases can only be reached through an accom-
modation of the two clauses, an accommodation arrived at after
scrupulous attention has been paid the concerns of each clause.
III. THE CASE
In Tulsa Area Hospital Council, Inc. v. Oral Roberts University,27
the Oklahoma Supreme Court will consider, among other things, 8 the
first amendment religion clauses. Simply stated, the facts as they shall
be before the Court are as follow.
In late 1977, Oral Roberts University (ORU) announced plans to
construct a medical complex, 9 the City of Faith, at its campus in Tulsa,
Oklahoma. Pursuant to Oklahoma law, ORU applied to the Oklahoma
Health Planning Commission (OHPC) for a Certificate of Need
25. Id at 404-06. The Sherbert majority notes an analogy here between free exercise and
free speech. Id at 406 n.5.
26. TRIBE, supra note 3, § 14-7, at 834.
27. No. 53059 (Okla., filed Sept. 10, 1979).
28. Also under consideration is the Tulsa Area Hospital Council's standing to challenge the
Oklahoma Health Planning Commission's action in the Tulsa County District Court under the
Oklahoma Administrative Procedures Act, OKLA. STAT. tit. 75, §§ 301-327 (1971), as well as ques-
tions regarding the district court's treatment of certain evidentiary matters in reviewing the OHPC
proceedings.
29. Brief of Appellant at I, Tulsa Area Hosp. Council, Inc. v. Oral Roberts Univ., No. 53059
(Okla., filed Sept. 10, 1979). "This complex would consist of three major buildings arising from a
common three-story base which houses mechanical systems and support facilities servicing the
three towers. Included in the complex is a sixty-story medical clinic-office building, a twenty-story
research-continuing education building and a thirty-story hospital." Id
[Vol. 15:644
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(CON).30 In considering an application for a CON, the OHPC must
determine whether the need for a new hospital facility exists.31 In
reaching that determination, the OHPC is statutorily directed to con-
sider:
(a) the adequacy of institutional health services in the
locality,
(b) the availability of services which may serve as alter-
natives or substitutes,
30. The health planning laws involved are formidable in their complexity, but need not de-
tain the reader inordinately. Nevertheless, some general understanding of the procedures in-
volved is necessary. In 1975 the Oklahoma legislature enacted the Institutional Health Services
Act, 1975 Okla. Sess. Laws, ch. 276, §§ 1-6 (codified at OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, §§ 2651-2656 (Supp.
1979)), thereby enlisting Oklahoma in a national health planning effort designed to promote the
orderly and economically efficacious development of health care facilities across the United
States. This effort was a response to the Hill-Burton Act under which massive federal funds were
made available for hospital construction in the years immediately following World War II. 42
U.S.C. § 291 (1976). Ultimately, supply came to far exceed demand, construction having contin-
ued past need. Oklahoma did not escape this syndrome, and over-supply has been a concern in
this state. See OKLAHOMA HEALTH PLANNING COUNCIL, HEALTH PLANNING REPORT 1, 4 (1978).
The process for assuring orderly facility growth is the product of a state-federal regulatory
coalition. Under the Institutional Health Services Act, OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, §§ 2651-2656 (Supp.
1979), both new and additional facility construction requires a Certificate of Need (CON) from
the Oklahoma Health Planning Commission (OHPC) a state agency comprised of the heads of the
state departments of Health, Mental Health, and Welfare. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 2651 (Supp.
1979).
Applications for a CON, however, do not begin with OHPC scrutiny; rather, these are first
reviewed by the Oklahoma Health Systems Agency (OHSA) a federally funded, nonprofit corpo-
ration consisting of thirty members representing consumers and health care providers. This or-
ganization makes its recommendation to the OHPC as to the propriety of the new construction
proposed. (While that process will not be developed here, the recommendation process is itself
complex, consisting of three identifiable aspects, including a public hearing.) The recommenda-
tions of the OHSA is advisory only, though they are part of the planning statute and are consid-
ered by the OHPC in its disposition of an application for a CON.
The OHPC, upon reaching its own determination of need, advises the federal Department of
Health, Education & Welfare. Should the OHPC's recommendation be unfavorable to the appli-
cant, the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1320 a-1 (Supp. 11 1978), empowers the Secretary of
Health, Education & Welfare to withhold, among other things, reimbursement of medicare and
medicaid to the extent that patient charges relate to capital expenditures for new or supplementary
construction. The purpose of§ 1320 a-I was declared to be, "to be sure that Federal funds appro-
priated under subchapters V, XVIII, and XIX of this chapter [medicare, medicaid and others] are
not used to support unnecessary capital expenditures by or on behalf of health care facilities
.... "Id.
After an unfavorable recommendation to the OHPC by the OHSA, the OHPC decided by
unanimous vote on April 26, 1978, to approve the construction of the City of Faith complex, and
granted a CON to ORU. (For a scrupulously detailed account of the history of the ORU applica-
tion for a CON and resistance thereto, see Brief of the Attorney General, Tulsa Area Hosp. Coun-
cil, Inc. v. Oral Roberts Univ., No. 53059 (Okla., filed Sept. 10, 1979).) For a discussion of the
hazards of health care facility oversupply, see A. SOMERS, HOSPITAL REGULATION: THE Di-
LEMMA OF PUBLIC POLICY (1969).
31. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 2651 (Supp. 1979).
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(c) the adequacy of financial resources for the new serv-
ices,
(d) the availability of sufficient manpower to properly
staff and operate the proposed new services,
(e) the availability of both allopathic and osteopathic
facilities and services to protect the freedom of patient choice
in the locality; and
(f) any other matter which the Commission deems ap-
propriate.32
ORU asserted that the City of Faith complex would satisfy three
needs, 33 including the needs of the national constituency of the Oral
Roberts Ministry for a facility wherein "holistic medicine" might be
practiced.34 After reviewing the ORU application, the OHPC issued a
CON to ORU based upon the following findings:35
(1) Mental attitudes and beliefs of people are important
to the physical healing process and should be considered by
the OHPC in its review of any application.
(2) A national constituency comprising the membership
of the Oral Roberts Ministry is possessed of such mental dic-
tates as would affect the health process, such dictates being in
the form of religious beliefs.36
Having made these determinations, the OHPC observed that no hospi-
tal accommodations were available which might address the beliefs of
the membership, and ruled that a new facility was needed within the
meaning of the statutory command.37
Throughout the CON process before the OHPC, the Tulsa Area
Hospital Council, Inc., opposed the ORU application. Upon favorable
disposition of the application, the Council appealed the OHPC decision
to the District Court of Tulsa County.38 While it was not contended
32. Id § 2652.
33. ORU described the needs it asserted in its application in the following terms: "(1) The
needs of the national constituency of the Oral Roberts Ministry. . . for a facility wherein holistic
medicine could be practiced; (2) The needs of the ORU medical school for a hospital wherein
clinical training could be provided; (3) The needs of ORU for a hospital wherein clinical re-
search could be conducted." Brief of Appellant at 2.
34. Id Holistic does not refer to "holy" medicine but to medicine which considers "man as a
functioning whole, or relat[es] to the conception of man as a functioning whole." DORLAND'S
ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 624 (23d ed. 1957).
35. The Attorney General lists some fourteen findings. Brief of the Attorney General at 4-5.
36. See Record at 44-2858 to 59.
37. Id
38. On May 9, 1978, the Tulsa Area Hospital Council appealed to the Tulsa County District
Court, naming both ORU and the OHPC as respondents. ORU moved to dismiss the appeal
under OKLA. STAT. tit. 75, § 318 (1971), insisting that the Council was not an aggrieved party
[Vol. 15:644
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that the OHPC might not legitimately consider influential mental atti-
tudes in determining need, the Council argued that religious beliefs
could not be counted among such attitudes in considering applications
for CONs.39
The OHPC determined that psychological and philosophical di-
rectives, including those which might be labeled religious dictates, are
profound in their effect upon the healing process. The OHPC further
determined that a national constituency comprising the Oral Roberts
Ministry is possessed of such directives in the form of religious beliefs
calling for medical services administered pursuant to a holistic medical
philosophy.4" Recognizing the potential influence of such inclinations
in the administration of clinical health care, the OHPC turned to ex-
isting facilities in search of any which might address the constituency's
holistic requirements.
The District Court of Tulsa County agreed with the Tulsa Area
Hospital Council that the manner in which the OHPC found a need for
the City of Faith complex was unconstitutional. 4 Specifically, the dis-
trict court ruled that the OHPC violated the establishment clause of the
first amendment in that "when. . .[it] went no further than to deter-
mine that there existed a 'need for a hospital practicing a particular
type of Holistic Medicine' an advantage was conferred on ORU on
solely a religious basis."4
Following this conclusion, the trial court proposed its own formula
by which, the court suggested, the OHPC could recognize need suffi-
cient to justify issuing a CON to ORU, while avoiding conflict with the
establishment clause. The formula would permit the OHPC to take
cognizance of the existence of the ORU constituency and of the de-
mand for holistic medicine, though such demand be religiously based.
The formula, however, would then direct the OHPC to compare need
so identified with the number of hospital beds available in all facilities
within the meaning of the statute and, therefore, lacked standing. At a hearing on July 28, 1978,
the District Court denied the motion to dismiss. This Order is now part of the record for appeal,
Recort at 262. The appeal taken by the Tulsa Area Hospital Council ultimately resulted in the
district court's December 1, 1978, Order. Record at 216.
39. The district court said, "[When the OHPC went no further than to determine that there
existed a 'need for a hospital practicing a particular type of Holistic Medicine' an advantage was
conferred on ORU on solely a religious basis." Record at 216. The court called upon the OHPC
to compare demand (a count taken of the constituency) with available bed-space in all area hospi-
tals. 1d
40. Record at 44-2859.
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in the Tulsa area, whether or not these facilities would minister to the
patient's holistic needs."a In short, while the court held that the OHPC
could legitimately determine that philosophical directives influence
clinical care, where such directives are born of religious beliefs, the dis-
trict court decision would preclude the OHPC from considering those
philosophical directives.
Whatever constitutional analysis it might have considered" or un-
dertaken, the district court elected not to include that analysis in its
order. The only statement the court made reflecting upon the legal
conclusion it reached is in the form of a citation from Gillette v. United
States.45 From that case, the district court selected two statements:
"An attack founded in disparate treatment of religious claims invokes
what is perhaps the central purpose of the Establishment Clause-the
purpose of ensuring governmental neutrality in matters of religion.
46
"[T]he Establishment Clause stands at least for the proposition that
when government activities touch on the religious sphere, they must be
secular in purpose, evenhanded in operation, and neutral in primary
impact."'47 Apparently, the district court concluded the OHPC had not
acted neutrally in considering the ORU application, but on precisely
what grounds it so concluded is open to speculation. It is impossible to
say from the order whether the district court thought the OHPC acted
for a religious purpose, whether it produced a primarily religious effect,
or whether its decision to award ORU with a CON would somehow
lead to an excessive involvement of state and religious institutions.
IV. APPEAL TO THE OKLAHOMA SUPREME COURT
In any event, the court's order presents the Oklahoma Supreme
Court with what is undoubtedly the most difficult first amendment reli-
gion clause questions ever addressed by that supreme court.48 In its
43. Id. at 213, 216.
44. The TAHC argued to the district court that granting the CON to ORU would entangle
the OHPC in religious matters. See notes 71-78 infra and accompanying text. The TAHC re-
newed the argument on appeal. See Brief for Appellee at 60. The court, however, never made
such a determination, or, if it did, it did not so declare in its order of December 1, 1978.
45. 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
46. Id at 449 (quoted in Record at 216).
47. Id. at 450 (quoted in Record at 216).
48. Oklahoma's courts have only infrequently considered the religion clauses. Most recently,
the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals considered-and rejected-a free exercise of religion
defense of one charged with drug related offenses. Lewellyn v. State, 592 P.2d 538 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1979). Compare this case with Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 244 (1879), wherein Reyn-
olds, a Mormon, unsuccessfully appealed a bigamy conviction on free exercise grounds.
[Vol. 15:644
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appeal, ORU has asserted as to its constitutional claims that first, the
OHPC did not violate the establishment clause, and second, that the
district court's "religion-blind" proposal for determining need violates
ORU's right of free exercise.49 Thus, the religious issues before the
Oklahoma Supreme Court appear to present themselves in the follow-
ing terms: Having determined that attitudinal influences may be so
profound in their impact upon clinical health care that they warrant
consideration in finding need for CON purposes, did the OHPC violate
the establishment clause when it counted ORU's religious convictions
among such attitudes? Would the exclusion of attitudinal influences
born of religious conviction from consideration in the CON process
violate the free exercise clause?
A. The Establishment Clause Claim
1. Secular Purpose Doctrine
The first of the three tests of establishment, the doctrine of secular
purpose,50 requires that a state point to some nonsectarian reason for
legislating or regulating.5" The doctrine is simply a reflex of the imme-
diate purpose of the free exercise clause, to remove religious beliefs
from the realm of those items which may be the legitimate object of
state concern.52
While a government may act only pursuant to secular ends, inci-
49. Brief of Appellant at 56-85.
50. This doctrine has been most clearly described in establishment clause cases, where it has
been deemed one of the three tests in an establishment accusation. See, e.g., Hunt v. McNair, 413
U.S. 734, 743 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
51. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). The secular purpose doctrine is funda-
mental to the notion of religious freedom. The principles underpinning it as part of the protection
of religious freedom are succinctly stated in Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890): "With
man's relations to his Maker and the obligations he may think they impose, and the manner in
which an expression shall be made by him of his belief on those subjects, no interference can be
permitted ... ." Id
52. This relationship is useful in explaining certain areas of doctrine, particularly, the belief-
action distinction discussed supra at note 21. Taken at face value as first articulated in Reynolds
the distinction is less than helpful. No real distinction is possible, and even where made does not
really answer important questions: Does the distinction and its attendant doctrine mean that the
state might forbid prayer, which is more fairly described as conduct than belief?. Must the state
hire a school bus driver whose religious beliefs include the slaughter of children? See Hollon v.
Pierce, 257 Cal. App. 2d 468, 470, 64 Cal. Rptr. 808, 810 (1968). To pose such questions is to
answer them. TRIBE, supra note 3, § 14-8, at 838. Here, the secular purpose doctrine comes to the
aid of understanding the Reynolds dichotomy. As Tribe observes, "Here, as in the context of free
speech, the real distinction must be between laws that aim only at a religious aspect of conduct or
seek to achieve a clearly religious end, and laws that aim at a secular dimension of the subject
matter either regulated or supported. It is here that this test (belief-conduct) coalesces with the
requirement of secular purpose." Id
10
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dental conformity of a state's purposes'with those entertained by reli-
gious institutions does not per se invalidate the governmental action.1
3
A coincidence of secular and sectarian interests does not threaten those
identified evils (here, probably sponsorship) which are the harbingers
of dreaded interdependence. Thus, for the most part, where state and
religious aims overlap, the Court has looked to a state's express recita-
tion of purpose and has found an establishment clause violation for
failure of the secular purpose test only in the complete absence of any
secular aim upon which the state may have acted.54
In the present case, the inquiry with regard to the secular purpose
doctrine may be distilled to this question: Having determined that in-
fluential philosophic directives were legitimate factors to be considered
in determining statutory need, did the OHPC seek to accomplish a sec-
tarian aim when it considered religious beliefs and their influence on
effective health care administration?
This question was never squarely decided or, for that matter, ad-
dressed by the district court. Nor was it argued there,55 a fact which
will complicate the question of purpose for the Oklahoma Supreme
53. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (upholding state Sunday closing laws in the
face of an establishment clause claim).
54. TRIBE, supra note 3, § 14-8, at 836. Moreover, it is immaterial that "[a] possibility al-
ways exists ... that the legitimate objectives of any law or legislative program may be subverted
by conscious design .... [Judicial concern about these possibilities cannot. . . warrant striking
down a statute as unconstitutional." Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 679 (1971).
For these reasons, the secular purpose test, however fundamental, has rarely proved decisive,
and has been described as a mere "threshold test." TRIBE, supra pote 3, § 14-8, at 835. A notable
exception exists, however, in Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968). There, the Court found
no "suggestion. . .[that] Arkansas' law [could] be justified by considerations of state policy other
than [a purpose to support] the religious views of some of its citizens." Id at 107. In support of
the notion that a demonstration of any legitimate state purpose will do, however, it is noteworthy
that the Epperson Court also stated: "The overriding fact is that Arkansas' law selects from the
body of knowledge a particular segment [theory of evolution] which it proscribesfor the sole rea-
son that it is deemed to conflict with a particular religious doctrine .. " Id (emphasis added).
But see School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (state law mandated reading of Bible pas-
sage in the public schools). When the law involved in Schempp, was challenged under the estab-
lishment clause, the state urged that its purpose was not religious, but rather that it was one to
promote nonreligious moral inspiration. The Court rejected this contention, declaring that the
facts before it were simply altogether inconsistent with the purpose tendered by the state. Id at
224.
55. The TAHC did not, at trial, urge that the OHPC had acted pursuant to a sectarian pur-
pose, nor that the effects of the agency's actions were other than secular. Rather, the Council
argued that should the OHPC grant the CON to ORU under the circumstances, a precedent
would be established such that other religious groups could not be denied CONs for similar rea-
sons offered in their applications. This would yield repeated state-church intercourse and, it is
argued, an entanglement of church and state. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 624 (1971)
(discussing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970), where this progression argument was re-
jected, but indicating that that argument was more persuasive under the Lemon facts).
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Court. Neither the OHPC nor ORU put forward any secular purposes
for which the OHPC might have been acting. Speculation in this case,
however, need not be ill-informed speculation. The statutory purposes
for which the OHPC must act are two-fold. First, the agency must act
to assure orderly hospital facility development for economic reasons;
second, the OHPC must also act to insure that health care needs are
met, either by existing facilities or by the construction of new facili-
ties.56
The availability of hospital facilities capable of delivering the most
effectual medical services to as many patients as possible-including
the membership of the Oral Roberts Ministry-is a concern shared by
ORU (for reasons of self-interest) and the OHPC (by virtue of statutory
mandate). To this extent the OHPC's aims overlap those of a religious
group. On the other hand, it is beyond doubt that the state has a legiti-
mate, if not emphatically compelling, interest in the effective adminis-
tration of health care to all patients seeking care within its borders.
This interest is no less secular because mutually entertained by ORU.
In short, this overlap of aims creates no real conflict with the establish-
ment clause.
Arguably, however, the district court did consider and reject im-
plicitly the possibility that the OHPC acted in this case in mere pursu-
ance of its statutory purposes. Indeed, this can be inferred from the
language in the trial court's order where the court stated that "an ad-
vantage was conferred on ORU on solely a religious basis." 57 This
might easily be taken to mean that the court decided that the OHPC
acted for religious rather than secular reasons, seeking to fulfill sectar-
ian rather than secular purposes. If this is the determination made on
appeal, then the OHPC's manner of finding a need for the City of Faith
complex is unconstitutional, and the inquiry need go no further.
As a practical matter, however, it seems unlikely that such was the
conclusion of the district court. It is less likely still that the Oklahoma
Supreme Court will so construe the trial court's language on appeal.
This is particularly true in that the OHPC findings as to the ORU ap-
plication are as consistent with secular purposes as they are with reli-
gious purposes. As ORU argued,
The observation (the OHPC finding) that attitudes of
whatever variety are an important factor in a patient's recov-
56. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 2651 (Supp. 1979).
57. Record at 216.
1980]
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ery is manifestly a secular observation, an observation suscep-
tible of being made about religion entirely without reference
to the internal affairs of religion. Neither is the observation
that the Oral Robert's constituency is possessed of certain be-
liefs which exert such influence anything other than a secular
observation.58
It is quite true that the OHPC could have made these determinations
without intending to advocate the religious beliefs it regarded as poten-
tially influential in administering health care services to a religious
group. In short, it seems unlikely that the religious issues on appeal
will be decided under the secular purpose doctrine.
2. Secular Effect Doctrine
The principle of secular effect59 mandates that official activity,
whatever its purpose, not produce an effect primarily to advance or
inhibit religion.60 The doctrine does not mandate, however, that the
effects a state seeks to produce through its activity may not be realized
in a religious context;6 nor does the doctrine invalidate state action
which incidentally advances religion by making the practice of reli-
gious traditions less costly or less burdensome.62 Rather, neutrality of
effect contemplates a benevolent neutrality,63 such that religion may be
58. Brief of Appellant at 67. ORU, also claimed, "To recognize the impact of beliefs upon
health care, and to recognize further that an identifiable group entertains beliefs of that ilk, is in
no way to adopt or advocate those beliefs." Id
59. This test, announced as one of the tests of establishment, has free exercise implications as
well. As Professor Tribe observes:
Even if it cannot be shown that a government policy was aimed at a religious aspect of
behavior, if the essential effect of the government's action is to influence-either posi-
tively or negatively-the pursuit of a religious tradition or the expression of a religious
belief, it should be struck down as violative of the free exercise clause if the effect is
negative, and of the establishment clause if positive.
TRIBE, supra note 3, § 14-9, at 839.
60. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S 734, 741 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13
(1971).
61. TRIBE, supra note 3, § 14-9, at 839-40. See also Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672
(1971).
62. The Supreme Court has recognized that incidental benefits to religious institutions in the
form of grants of money, materials, and tax relief make the practice of religion easier: "[B]us
transportation, textbooks, and tax exemptions all gave aid in the sense that religious bodies would
otherwise have been forced to find other sources from which to finance these services. Yet all of
these forms of governmental assistance have been upheld." Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672,
679 (1971) (citations omitted).
63. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437,454 (1971). The notion of benevolent neutrality is
described in Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970), as a function of the interplay between the
establishment and free exercise clauses.
The general principle deducible from the First Amendment and all that has been
said by the Court is this: that we will not tolerate either governmentally established
13
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incidentally or indirectly advanced along with the general welfare64
through beneficent legislative or executive activity.
With regard to the ORU case the secular effect inquiry might be
phrased in this way: Was the effect of the OHPC's action one primarily
advancing the religion of the Oral Roberts Ministry, or would the
agency's actions yield a primarily secular effect, attended by an inci-
dental effect to advance the religion of the Oral Roberts Ministry? In
addressing this question, a brief review of the OHPC's findings, upon
which it based the decision to issue the CON to ORU, might prove
helpful. First, the OHPC found that a patient's attitudes and philo-
sophic inclinations operate to influence his capacity for clinical recov-
ery. Accordingly, the OHPC resolved to take cognizance of such
matters in arriving at the required statutory need determination. Per-
religion or governmental interference with religion. Short of those expressly proscribed
governmental acts there is room for play in the joints productive of a benevolent neutral-
ity which will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without interfer-
ence.
Id at 669. Later in that case, the Court observed, "Few concepts are more deeply embedded in
the fabric of our national life, beginning with pre-Revolutionary colonial times, than for the gov-
ernment to exercise at the very least this kind of benevolent neutrality toward churches and reli-
gious exercise .... " Id at 676-77.
A similar notion emerges from Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952). There, however,
benevolence was embraced by the term, "accomodation". That is, the government may accomo-
date its programs to the interests of religious bodies. For an extensive discussion of the notion of
accomodation, see TRIBE, supra note 3, at § 14-5. A good summary statement of the place of
accomodation in the first amendment framework is contained in the following language from
Zorach v. Clauson:
When the state encourages religious instruction or cooperates with religious authori-
ties by adjusting the schedule of public events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of
our traditions. For it then respects the religious nature of our people and accommodates
the public service to their spiritual needs. To hold that it may not would be to find in the
Constitution a requirement that the government show a callous indifference to religious
groups. That would be preferring those who believe in no religion over those who do
believe.
343 U.S. at 313-14.
64. In Cochran v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930), the Court had before it a
state statute requiring school books to be furnished without charge to all students, whether attend-
ing private or public schools. In response to the charge that the statute served no public purpose
and, thereby, violated the establishment clause, the Court drew the following conclusion: "[The
State's] interest is education, broadly; its method, comprehensive. Individual interests are aided
only as the common interest is safeguarded." Id at 375.
Similarly, in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1946), the Supreme Court upheld a New
Jersey statute authorizing local school districts to provide transportation of school children to and
from school, including children attending parochial schools. Therein, the Court announced,
"[Wle must be careful, in protecting the citizens of New Jersey against state-established churches,
to be sure that we do not inadvertently prohibit New Jersey from extending its general state law
benefits to all its citizens without regard to their religious belief." Id at 16. The Court implied
this same proposition in Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977), when it stated, "This Court's
decisions contain a common thread to the effect that the provision of health services to all school-
children-public and nonpublic-does not have the primary effect of aiding religion." Id at 242.
See also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 616-17 (1971).
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ceiving the beliefs of the Ministry membership to be convictions of a
kind having great clinical significance in successful health care admin-
istration to this group, the OHPC authorized the construction of the
City of Faith complex.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court's resolution of the secular effect
question will turn on the breadth with which it perceives the OHPC's
findings. Narrowly viewed, the finding is no more than the agency's
conclusion that a particular religious group is possessed of certain con-
victions about holistic medicine, convictions that show only a member-
ship demand65 for health care administered pursuant to a particular
religious philosophy. If the OHPC's finding so perceived was the basis
of its issuing a CON to ORU, it is clear that the Oral Roberts Ministry
is directly and primarily advanced. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine
how the general welfare would be advanced at all by the favorable dis-
position of the ORU application.
The findings of the agency, however, may as easily be viewed
broadly. Then, the critical finding of the OHPC should be regarded as
that which recognized the impact of attitudes and philosophic direc-
tives of allkinds on health care. Arguably, at least, this finding repre-
sents a step forward in reaching enlightened decisions on the question
of need for hospital facilities, decisions which consider more than mere
bed count figures. This finding might, therefore, be deemed generally
beneficial to all who are without access to facilities catering to their
special needs. The general welfare is surely enhanced where more
complete and efficacious health care is afforded more persons through
sensitive and enlightened decision making.
If this is the view taken of the OHPC findings, the primary effect
inquiry must be rephrased. In this case, the Ministry membership is
suddenly not receiving especial treatment, but is seeking to take advan-
tage of generally beneficial state activity. Specifically, given that the
OHPC resolved to consider attitudinal influences in reaching its need
decisions, the membership was seeking to have its own attitudinal in-
fluences, concededly religious in origin, considered in the agency's
CON process on equal footing with other applicants. It is certainly
arguable that this is precisely what the OHPC did, and if this is the
case, the constitutional inquiry must be stated anew: Was the Oral
Roberts Ministry impermissibly advanced when the holistic convictions
65. See notes 42-43 supra and accompanying text.
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of its membership were recognized by the OHPC in the CON process
in the same way as secular attitudinal influence would be recognized?
This issue is not-and will not-be susceptible of easy disposition.
But it may be said with some confidence that so far as the United States
Supreme Court is concerned, this sort of equal treatment of religious
and secular entities as to benevolent state activity is not beyond the
constitutional pale.66 Indeed, the alternatives are less than satisfactory.
To exclude the convictions of a religious group because those convic-
tions are religiously engendered, 67 even where it is clear that such con-
victions profoundly affect the successful administration of health care
services to those possessed of such convictions is hostility, not neutral-
ity.68 The process employed by the OHPC would be one of segregating
those attitudinal influences determined to be religious in origin and dis-
regarding them, although the agency may have deemed them influen-
tial in health care.
An inimical treatment of religion, however, is not required by the
establishment clause, and to require the OHPC to identify certain con-
victions to be religious, then to isolate them for singular unfavorable
treatment because they are religious is not constitutionally required.
Indeed, such action might well be constitutionally proscribed. In any
event, resolution of the secular effect question will require cautious
concept-structuring of the OHPC findings by the Oklahoma court.
Resolution of that issue will turn on the conceptual model the court
chooses to adopt. It is here that the most difficulty faces the court.
B. Entanglement Doctrine
The third and final test of establishment is concerned with an ex-
cessive entanglement of the affairs of state with the affairs of church.6 9
The entanglement may be of two sorts identified by the United States
Supreme Court, political entanglement or administrative entanglement.
Political entanglement describes an involvement of state and church
resulting in political division along religious lines,7" "and reflects a
66. Arguably, an equal protection clause claim presents itself under all such circumstances.
But see Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 449 n.6 (1971).
67. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1947).
68. Id
69. Roemer v. Maryland Pub. Works Bd., 426 U.S. 736, 745 (1976); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602, 613 (1971).
70. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 372 (1975). See generally Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
672, 386 (1971); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622-23 (1971).
1980]
16
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 15 [1979], Iss. 3, Art. 12
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol15/iss3/12
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
characteristically Jeffersonian fear of church intrusion into politics." 7 1
Administrative entanglement, on the other hand, seeks to avoid an in-
volvement of state and church for fear that the state under such circum-
stances "might too readily intrude into the spiritual realm."72
Whether entanglement is excessive or otherwise, is a question of
degree.73 Certain activities of the state which bring it into contact with
religious institutions, however, have long been regarded as fraught with
the dangers of excessive entanglement, and have been carefully scruti-
nized by the United States Supreme Court. In particular, state pro-
grams which call for the repeated and regular contact of state and
church institutions are regarded with suspicion, inasmuch as these may
encourage "extensive state investigation into church operations and
finances."7 4 As well, associations should generally be avoided which
call upon the state to make "difficult classifications of what is or is not
religious."75 For these reasons, continuing aid programs are more
likely to result in entanglement which may be described as excessive
than are "one time, single purpose" associations between religious and
governmental entities.76
It takes an extended effort to imagine that the OHPC's favorable
disposition of the ORU application for a CON might somehow become
an entangling precedent, whatever the constitutional merits of that ac-
tion otherwise. Granting the certificate does not call upon the OHPC
to become involved in the day-to-day matters of the City of Faith com-
plex. Instead, it appears that all contact would cease upon disposition
of the application. The point is, of the three principles upon which the
Oklahoma Supreme Court could arguably uphold the ruling of the un-
constitutionality of the OHPC's actions, the entanglement principle is
the least plausible.
C. The Free Exercise Claim
On appeal from the trial court's adverse ruling, ORU has asserted
71. TRIBE, supra note 3, § 14-12, at 866.
72. Id
73. Roemer v. Maryland Pub. Works Bd., 426 U.S. 736, 766-67 (1976). See Tilton v. Rich-
ardson, 403 U.S. 672, 688 (1971).
74. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 691 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring). See Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 620 (1971).
75. Walz v. Tax Comn'n, 397 U.S. 664, 698 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). TRIBE, stera
note 3, § 14-12, at 869.
76. Roemer v. Maryland Pub. Works Bd., 426 U.S. 736, 766 (1976).
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not only that the OHPC did not violate the establishment clause,77 it
argued further that, "[tlo the extent the lower court's order would im-
pose a religiously hostile formula upon the OHPC in calculating need,
a formula that would exclude appellant's convictions from considera-
tion, the Order violates appellant's right of free exercise as guaranteed
by the First Amendment."78 Specifically, ORU urged that should reli-
gious convictions be excluded from the general class, attitudinal influ-
ences, in determining statutory need, the result would be a burden
upon its religious practices yielding coercion of beliefs proper by indi-
rection.7 9 To adopt a view conforming to that of ORU in this matter, it
is necessary first to adopt what was earlier described as a "broad
view"8 0 of the OHPC findings at issue. From this perspective, ORU's
argument becomes at once apparent; the alleged burden upon ORU's
religious practices is disclosed. If the beneficial activity of the OHPC
resided in its determination that influential attitudes will be considered
in the CON process, then to exclude religious convictions because they
are religious convictions is to deny religious groups the benefits of offi-
cial activity available to others with directives rooted in secular convic-
tions.
It is clear that the protection of the free exercise clause reaches not
only penalties imposed by the state upon religious practices, but that it
also reaches the withholding of state benefits, where to do so would
burden religious practice.8' The prototypical case here is Sherbert v.
Verner8 2 upon which ORU has relied heavily in its argument to the
Oklahoma court.83 In Sherbert the United States Supreme Court held
that the state impermissibly burdened religious practice where, without
exempting Seventh Day Adventists, it denied unemployment benefits
to all who refused to work Saturdays.
The burden on religious practice in Sherbert is fairly clear. Sev-
enth Day Adventists were forced to elect between collecting unemploy-
ment benefits and observing a religious conviction against working
Saturdays. The resultant, if indirect, pressure upon the conviction is
clear-the individual is urged indirectly to forgo the belief altogether,
because the conviction without observance would be of little conse-
77. See Brief of Appellant at 56.
78. Id at 76.
79. Id at 80-81.
80. See notes 66-67 supra and accompanying text.
81. See note 25 supra.
82. 374 U.S. 398, 404-06 (1963).
83. See Brief of Appellant at 78.
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quence. 4 The burden upon ORU, however, is not so clear. The "dis-
crimination"85 argument is somewhat compelling, but it is difficult to
imagine how the Ministry membership would be coerced into forfeiting
its convictions as to holistic medicine in the event that the OHPC were
to exclude religious directives, however influential, from the CON
process. ORU is not precluded from applying for and receiving a
CON; rather, it would simply be required to make a showing of secular
need to be awarded the certificate.8 6
Still, the refusal to consider religious convictions and influences in
health care need determination would, arguably, foreclose to ORU one
avenue of showing need, an avenue available to those whose attitudes
are not born of religious notions. To do so would place ORU in a less
favorable position and would make it more difficult for ORU to show
need.
Assuming the Oklahoma Supreme Court agrees that the formula
advocated by the district court (that is, one foreclosing the effect of reli-
gious convictions from consideration in the CON process) burdens
ORU's religious practice, the state must show that such a formula is the
least burdensome means to some compelling end. 7 With this in mind,
two observations about the free exercise test, are in order. First, as to
compelling end, the United States Supreme Court has been (at least
recently)88 exacting in its demands. It is clear that a polite nod in the
direction of some merely legitimate state inerest will not do. 89 More-
over, it is equally clear that the requirement that the means to such end
be the least burdensome or restrictive is no less exacting.9° In view of
84. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
85. Brief of Appellant at 80.
86. See notes 43-47 supra and accompanying text.
87. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
88. Cf. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879) (upholding polygamy conviction over
religious objections). Tribe severely criticizes this decision, suggesting that the amorphous social
goal announced by the Court in that case would not, after Sherbert, justify the burden upon
religious practice involved. TRIBE, supra note 3, § 14-10, at 853-54.
89. "The essence of all that has been said and written on the subject is that only those inter-
ests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the
free exercise of religion." Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972). In Yader, even the state's
concededly paramount interest in public education failed to overbalance the burden upon free
exercise. The Sherbert Court declared that "[tihe conduct or actions so regulated have invariably
posed some substantial threat to public safety, peace or order." 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963). Thomas
v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945) (cited with approval in Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406) noted: "Only the
gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitations." 323
U.S. at 530.
90. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 408-09 (1963) (distinguishing Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) in this respect).
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the fairly stubborn adherence called for by the Supreme Court in ap-
plying these standards, and assuming the Oklahoma Supreme Court
will apply them with equal fervor, the district court's proposal for find-
ig need may not fare well.
The only end to be promoted in excluding religious directives from
among those considered in the CON process was the district court's aim
to avoid an establishment clause violation. Whether such an end could
be regarded as legitimate, let alone compelling, is difficult to say,91 but
accomodations made for free exercise values do not violate the estab-
lishment clause.92 Therefore, if it is determined that the district court's
formula will burden ORU's religious practices, it would be no answer
to declare that the formula sought the ends of nonestablishment.
It would be more difficult to regard the trial court's religion-free
formula as the least burdensome of alternatives open to the OHPC.
The alternate route to avoid establishment is that already taken by the
OHPC, "an alternative that would not discriminate against the Oral
Roberts Ministry."93 The OHPC could simply continue to recognize
religious convictions as influential in the same way as secular convic-
tions are influential.
V. CONCLUSION
The above analysis proceeds from the broad view construction of
the OHPC findings described above and assumed by ORU. 94 Absent
the Oklahoma court's agreement in this regard, ORU's free exercise
claim largely evaporates. It can be said with assurance that this appeal
presents the Oklahoma court with religion clause issues of the greatest
significance. The court's resolution of the trial court's establishment
clause ruling is more likely to turn on the primary effect test and less, if
at all, upon the other tests of establishment, the secular purpose doc-
trine and the concept of excessive entanglement. This possibility, how-
ever, does not go far in lessening the difficulty of addressing the
establishment clause claim. Even to phrase the primary effect issue will
likely prove no mean feat. The court's view of the OHPC findings-
91. This question was raised, but not decided, in McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 628-29
(1978). But see TRIBE, supra note 3, § 14-10, at 852.
92. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S 205, 220-21 (1971); Sherbert v. Vemer, 374 U.S. 398,
409 (1963).
93. Brief of Appellant at 82.
94. Id at 72-75.
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either from the broad perspective proffered by appellant or the nar-
rower view-may well be determinative of the issue.
The free exercise claim of ORU also depends heavily upon the
broad view of the OHPC findings. Only from this perspective are the
appellant's allegations of discriminatory hostile treatment under the
trial court's need formula apparent. Only from this perspective does
ORU bring itself within the spirit, if not the letter, of Sherbert v. Ver-
ner95 upon which ORU so heavily relies. Should ORU's primary effect
argument collapse, its free exercise claim is as likely to collapse in its
wake.
F Stephen Knippenberg
95. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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